Four Comments On The War1. Over the last few weeks, I've been engaged in a debate with Elster over his charge that Israel "underestimated" Hezbollah. I strongly disagree that Israel's military or political leadership was surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities and resolve, and believe instead that overconfidence in air power and complacency generally were the leadership's primary failings.
However, I do believe that soldiers - not reservists, but the 18-21 year old kids serving their three years of army service - might have been surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities. Unlike reservists who had previous combat experience in Lebanon, the young soldiers' only combat experience was against Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and they might have been expecting something similar.
In light of what Israel has gone through with the Palestinians over the last six years, it's somewhat understandable that combat units have primarily been trained to fight Palestinian terror. However, Israel's military and political leadership must be blamed for hastily going into a war that their combat soldiers were not ready to fight. There was no need to attack Lebanon within hours after Hezbollah's July 12 attack.
2. Around ten days into the war, while I was in Israel, a friend of mine told me that his boss had been called into reservist combat duty. According to my friend, his boss told his commander that while he was willing to report, he was 40 years old, out of shape, and hadn't been in combat in years, and that he doubted he could help the military effort. The commander told him to come, that the IDF needed soldiers with combat experience in Lebanon.
I don't know whether to take this as a mere anecdote, or as part of the military complacency. Why weren't reservists who were to fight in Lebanon, if necessary, given more military training so that they would be adequately prepared in the event of war?
3. There must be a Commission of Inquiry to investigate Israel's failures, particularly the pre-war failures as to why Hezbollah was allowed to build up a state within a state and to amass advanced weaponry since Israel's withdrawal in 2000.
Unfortunately, I believe Israel's political leadership to be completely rotten. Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert all deserve very significant blame for the complete failure to deal with the threat from the north. Olmert, in a way, is least to blame, since he has only been prime minister for seven months. Yet, Olmert was a senior cabinet minister and deputy prime minister in Sharon's government, and should not have made bombastic and grandiose statements about crushing Hezbollah.
4. Indeed, had Olmert stated more realistic and modest goals early on, Israel would not be dealing with the stench of defeat. The truth is that using objective criteria, while Israel's stated goals have not been achieved, it has not lost this war. If - and it's a big if - the UN and the Lebanese government do what they are supposed to do, Hezbollah will no longer be on the border with Israel. That, along with the destruction of many Hezbollah positions, is not an insignificant achievement. However, as has been stated, perception is often more important than reality in the Middle East, and the perception on the Arab street is not one that is good for Israel, or, for that matter, the U.S.
posted on 8/12/2006
