A clandestine undertaking on behalf of Israel, the Jets and the Jews.

 
Michael Oren's Faulty Analysis

I have long been a fan of Michael Oren of the Shalem Center. Indeed, I have identified Oren's book, 'Six Days of War', as one of my favorites, and his military and political analysis - both oral and written - is routinely right on target.

Surprisingly, Oren's column in today's Wall Street Journal contains a number of inaccuracies. Oren's premise is that in the past Israel won its wars but lost "the subsequent diplomatic contests," while today, Israel may not win a decisive victory over Hezbollah, but the pending proposed UN resolution could be "a breakthrough for Israeli diplomacy."

In setting forth this argument, Oren makes a number overly simplistic factual statements. First, he writes that "In its 1948 War of Independence, Israel defeated six Arab armies and yet at the end of the fighting merely achieved armistice agreements that denied it recognition and perpetuated the state of war."

That is true, but the armistice agreements allowed Israel to permanently retain territory captured in the War of Independence, and that territory is significantly
larger than what Israel was to receive in the 1947 UN partition plan. Nearly six decades later, the international community accepts that Israel's borders should be based on its 1949 post-War of Independence borders, rather on the UN's pre-war partition plan. That was and is a diplomatic victory.

Next, Oren submits that "Israel's unqualified victory in the 1967 Six Day War produced United Nations Resolution 242, which, contrary to conventional belief, does not explicitly require Arab rulers to recognize the Jewish state even in return for territory."

However, in sharp contrast to the international community's forcing of Israel to cede Sinai and Gaza shortly after its 1956 victory over Egypt, UN Resolution 242 did not require an Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights. Instead, it allowed Israel to retain those territories as bargaining chips in negotiations with its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, Israel's right to exist in "secure borders" was recognized in UN Resolution 242.

Israel's ultimate unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, noted by Oren, was not a diplomatic defeat. It was a decision voluntarily entered into and implemented by Israel's previous government. (For what it's worth, it is also a decision that Oren fully supported.)

Oren then claims that Israel has been unable "to make military capital yield diplomatic dividends." Not only does that ignore the tacit acceptance of Israel's annexation of the territory it captured in 1948-49, as well as the positive aspects of UN Resolution 242, it completely forgets that Israel's peace treaty with Egypt was a direct result of Israel's military victories in 1967 and 1973. The victory over Jordan in 1967 and the treaty with Egypt also led to Israel's relatively friendly relationship with King Hussein of Jordan, and eventually, to the 1995 peace agreement between Israel and Jordan.

With regard to the current situation, Oren greatly exaggerates the benefits to Israel of the proposed UN Resolution calling for a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. According to Oren, the proposed international force "can expel all terrorist elements from the area between the border and the Litani, and enforce an international embargo on the sale and supply of arms to Hezbollah." But the proposed resolution merely recommends the formation of an international force, and a second resolution would have to be passed to actually authorize the formation of that force.

Furthermore, even if such a force is actually deployed, it is quite unlikely that it can or will "expel all terrorist elements from the area" or "enforce an international embargo on the sale and supply of arms to Hezbollah." If the IDF cannot accomplish these goals - and Oren writes that it would be impossible to do so without "decimating the entire country" - why would a force primarily comprised of troops from EU states be expected to expel Hezbollah and prevent its acquisition of arms, particularly given that the EU refuses to even label Hezbollah as a terror group, and (with the exception of Britain) continues to maintain cozy relations with Syria and Iran.

Oren also misconstrues the draft resolution when he writes that "Israel will receive the unconditional release of its kidnapped soldiers." While the resolution does call for the unconditional release of the IDF soldiers, such release is not a condition precedent to a ceasefire. In other words, even if Hezbollah refuses to release the soldiers, as it surely will, Israel must comply with the ceasefire.

Furthermore, Oren makes much over the fact that Israel's military victories did not result in recognition of Israel by its enemies. If lack of recognition is a diplomatic failure, isn't the fact that Israel remains under serious threat from Iran and its Hezbollah proxy, and has not been recognized by Lebanon, a diplomatic shortcoming today?

Michael Oren can usually be relied upon for sober and pragmatic analysis of the situation in the Middle East. While the flaws in his column in today's Wall Street Journal would therefore appear to be aberrational, they cannot go unchallenged, as wishful thinking is neither a solution to Israel's inability to crush Hezbollah, nor to Israel's security and diplomatic problems.
posted on 8/08/2006