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Ephraim Halevi on Sharon and the Road Map

Ari Shavit has an interesting interview with Ephraim Halevi in this week's Haaretz Magazine. Halevi is a former Mossad head who recently resigned as director of the National Security Council because of deep concerns about the Sharon government's decisions.

For example, according to Halevi, "there is an intolerable sense of offhandedness in Israel today in making fateful decisions." While Halevi's views are not right-wing, he is particularly critical of Israel's acceptance of the road map: "The road map is not a road map. It is a plan for an imposed settlement. It marks out a clear route that leads to an imposed settlement."

Halevi emphasized that the "concessions" to be made by Palestinians under the road map were already supposed to have been made under Oslo: "In the Oslo Accords, Israel recognized the rights of the Palestinians and in return obtained their agreement not to advance their goals by force. Not to use terrorism. Throughout the entire process, the Palestinians recognized only our reality, whereas we recognized their rights. That was a mistake. The road map repeats that mistake. It demands that Israel give the Palestinians strategic assets and in return all Israel gets is a war against terrorism and another war against terrorism. That's not good enough. It's even dangerous. It is liable to lead us in the end into a situation in which we will find ourselves close to the 1967 borders without the Palestinians having recognized Israel's right of existence and without their having forgone the right of return."

Before resigning, Halevi asked Sharon to present an alternative plan which would have offered significant concessions in exchange for something concerte in return from the PA, but his counsel was ignored: "I am certain that it was possible to bypass the road map. The truth is that the Americans didn't want it, either. They were dragged into adopting the road map only because Israel didn't offer them an alternative proposal. Israel did not take an initiative that could have set the agenda and shaped a process that would be more correct. I believe that Israel's basic mistake is that we yield to the temptation to adopt the salami method. At any given moment we slice a bit off the salami and then we don't get any genuine quid pro quo for it. I would put about half the salami on the table but I would demand a high price for it. I would offer more and demand more."

Halevi also refutes the notion that Israel's participation in the road map is reversible: "The prime minister may be telling himself that it's better not to quarrel with the Americans now and that it's always possible to quarrel with them, but that's an optical illusion. Because the more we advance in the process, the less ability we will have to say that we're not playing anymore, the rules were broken. And with all respect to the friendship between George and Ariel, that friendship fetters Ariel, not George. And if at the last minute George should call and say, `Listen, Ariel, this is what we were able to get, sign and finish,' it will be impossible to say no. We will find ourselves in a very difficult situation."
posted on 9/04/2003