GazaI have not recently posted in detail about the impending destruction of the Jewish communities in Gaza. This is not due to lack of interest on my part, but because I have previously posted in detail on the subject and do not wish to be repetitive.
I think, however, that it is now appropriate to state my general thoughts on the matter:
1. In the 2003 election campaign, Amram Mitzna advocated unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Ariel Sharon derided Mitzna for this. Sharon therefore does not hold a mandate to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza.
2. When Abu Mazen was appointed prime minister of the Palestinian Authority later in 2003, Sharon failed to offer any significant concessions. Why didn't he offer then to dismantle the three isolated Gaza settlements in return for a PA war against Hamas? Even though the PA would not have actually cracked down on the terrorists, Sharon would have gained political capital.
3. According to Dov Weisglass, Sharon's senior adviser, the decision to withdraw from Gaza and the northern West Bank communities was made in November 2003, after several prominent IDF veterans criticized government policy in the territories.
Reversing decades of pro-settler policy in such an immediate manner strikes one as a decision of political expediency. This is particularly the case given that (i) at the time Sharon was facing possible indictment for corruption and (ii) it was Sharon himself who is responsible for many of the Gaza communities.
4. Despite building the Gaza settlements, Sharon has never explained why they now must be dismantled. Was he wrong before? Might he be wrong now? Have political or demographic circumstances changed? He hasn't said.
5. Instead of a national address to Israelis, Sharon announced the decision to withdraw from Gaza in an interview requested by Sharon with Yoel Marcus of Haaretz. Prior to that interview, Marcus, along with most of the rest of Haaretz's staff, was strongly critical of Sharon. Now Marcus champions and lauds him.
The manner in which the withdrawal was announced was juvenile. Can anyone imagine President Bush announcing a major policy shift - perhaps something like a withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia - in an interview with Frank Rich of the New York Times, and then simply refusing to answer questions about the decision?
6. In early 2004, Sharon did state that while Israel would withdraw from Gaza and the northern West Bank communities, it would "strengthen" its presence in other parts of the territories. However, Israel has now decided that its security fence will only encompass 6 percent of the West Bank, not 16 percent as originally decided. As a result, even if all the territory within the fence becomes Israel's permanent borders (far from a sure thing), Israel will retain only a very small amount more than Ehud Barak agreed to cede in early 2001 at Taba.
7. In April 2004, Sharon announced that a referendum would be held among Likud members to decide whether or not Israel would withdraw from Gaza. The results would be binding, Sharon insisted.
8. After losing the referendum in a landslide, Sharon changed his mind and declared the referendum non-binding. He said that an alternative plan would be formulated.
9. The alternative plan turned out to be identical to the original plan. Yet Sharon insists on going ahead with the plan without a referendum or new election.
10. When Sharon feared that he would lose a cabinet vote on his plan, he simply fired two National Union ministers who were opposed to the plan. Later, he fired Uzi Landau and other Likud ministers and deputy ministers who criticized him.
11. With Arafat dead and Abu Mazen leading the PA, had Sharon waited a year to announce his willingness to withdraw from Gaza, he likely could have demanded - with strong international support - significant reciprocal concessions. Now, the destruction of Gaza is a given, and the world is demanding to know what concessions will come next.
12. I understand the Bush Administration's support for dismantling of settlements, which may help U.S. interests in the Arab world. I'm tired, however, of Condoleeza Rice's constant glee and excitement on the matter. More frustrating is the failure of Jewish Republicans and other Bush supporters who are also opponents of the Sharon plan to say anything even in polite protest of the lack of sensitivity by Rice and others toward the Gaza residents.
13. I visited several of the Gaza communities during succos in 2003. Despite my own personal feelings of support for the residents of Gaza and my pain at the prospect of their communities and life's work being destroyed, I do have strong doubts as to the long-term viability of the Gaza communities. Political, security and demographic realities suggest that they cannot be permanently retained. Had Israel's strategy been to build in Gush Katif and annex part of that area to expand the Ashkelon region, it might have been a success. But too many of the settlements are surrounded by Khan Yunis, and the number of IDF soldiers required to protect the Jews living there may be too high.
14. While we should feel free to express our opinions, those of us living outside Israel should be very cautious in the manner in which we express our position on the ultimate resolution of this issue. The matter is complex, with various costs and benefits. When neither you nor a close relative is serving in the IDF, it is convenient to take a hard-line position. Similarly, when all you know about the Gaza settlements is based on what you read in the Times, you should be reticent in calling for them to be eliminated.
15. In light of the above, a decision to withdraw from Gaza and the northern West Bank and to dismantle the settlements there has legitimate basis. However, I lack confidence in Sharon's decision to dismantle the Gaza and northern West Bank communities, and do not believe that the decision and the manner in which it is being implemented are consistent with democratic norms. Therefore, a referendum should be held, with the Israeli people deciding.
16. In reality, however, regardless of whether a referendum is held and the results of a referendum if one is held, the die is cast, and these communities do not have a long-term future. The damage to their status is irreversible. Therefore, the main focus of the struggle by those who support retention of parts of Judea and Samaria should be ensuring that Israel is not forced back to (or very near) the '67 borders, as current trends suggest is happening. Otherwise, next year at this time, the discussion will be about the future of Beit El and Ofra, communities that a few years ago were part of the consensus and now may be among the next on the chopping block.
posted on 2/23/2005
