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Fears Of Bad Ramifications For Israel

UPDATE: 11:34 a.m.: Haaretz is reporting that Prime Minister Olmert is dissatisfied with the proposed terms for a ceasefire, and has authorized the IDF to implement its proposal for a broad operation in Lebanon.

UPDATE: 12:02 p.m.: Apparently, late changes to the text demanded by the Arab League and agreed to by Secretary of State Rice caused Olmert to reject the proposed UN resolution. Nice job by the Orthodox Union thanking Condi for her "support."

Last night, a non-Jewish friend e-mailed me the following:

Joe,

Please, please tell me that Olmert and Peretz are not going to support or accept the UN resolution which is currently on the table.

How can they allow Hez to not be disarmed?

I am not usually given to dire prognostications, but I fear this could have hugely bad ramifications for Israel.

Today's editorial in The Jerusalem Post submits a similar sentiment, and laments that the Bush Administration appears to have terminated its support for Israel's military operations:

The White House's sudden decision to return to the language of moral equivalence is very puzzling and disturbing. Presidential spokesman Tony Snow said just after the cabinet decision that "we want an end to violence and we do not want escalations."

What does this mean? That suddenly the White House sees Israel on the same plane as Hizbullah? Does it mean that President George W. Bush believes that a UN resolution imposed now, perhaps after a watering-down by France at the behest of the Arab League, will produce the long-term stability that Washington has said it is seeking?...

The White House should not be pressuring the Israeli government, and Israel's prime minister should not be pretending - or worse, not pretending - that he might accede to that pressure...

It should need no explaining to this White House that for Israel to wave a white flag in the face of Hizbullah would have implications similar to those of the US doing so in Iraq. Iran's attack, through Hizbullah, is as much an attack on and a test of the United States as it is of Israel.

In today's Haaretz, Ari Shavit offers a blistering critique of Prime Minister Olmert, writing:

If Olmert runs away now from the war he initiated, he will not be able to remain prime minister for even one more day. Chutzpah has its limits. You cannot lead an entire nation to war promising victory, produce humiliating defeat and remain in power. You cannot bury 120 Israelis in cemeteries, keep a million Israelis in shelters for a month, wear down deterrent power, bring the next war very close, and then say - oops, I made a mistake. That was not the intention. Pass me a cigar, please.

There is no mistake Ehud Olmert did not make this past month. He went to war hastily, without properly gauging the outcome. He blindly followed the military without asking the necessary questions. He mistakenly gambled on air operations, was strangely late with the ground operation, and failed to implement the army's original plan, much more daring and sophisticated than that which was implemented. And after arrogantly and hastily bursting into war, Olmert managed it hesitantly, unfocused and limp. He neglected the home front and abandoned the residents of the north. He also failed shamefully on the diplomatic front.

Still, if Olmert had come to his senses as Golda Meir did during the Yom Kippur War, if he had become a leader, established a war cabinet and called the nation to a supreme effort that would change the face of the battle, a penetrating discussion of his failures could be postponed. But in blinking first over the past 24 hours, he has become an incorrigible political personality. Therefore, the day Nasrallah comes out of his bunker and declares victory to the whole world, Olmert must not be in the prime minister's office. Post-war battered and bleeding Israel needs a new start and a new leader. It needs a real prime minister.

In principle, I agree with the sentiments expressed by my friend, by Ari Shavit and by The Jerusalem Post.

Yet I'm ambivalent, because I just don't know whether a protracted ground operation will result in a radical change. It is nearly certain that hundreds of IDF soldiers - mostly reservists who thought they'd be enjoying the summer - would sacrifice their lives. Many others will survive but lose limbs, or otherwise be severely maimed. The residents of northern Israel will continue to live in bomb shelters, or be displaced, for an indefinite period. Israel would still be hit with daily barrages of rockets.

There has been a lot of talk about the purported failure of Israel's air war. While it's true that air strikes are not enough, the primary reason why Israel's air strikes have not had as much of a strategic effect as had been hoped is that Israel has been severely constrained from utilizing the IAF's abilities. Hezbollah has made sure to operate from civilian locations, and as a result, Israel's air strikes have routinely caused civilian collateral damage. The media and the international community immediately condemn Israel. As a result, Israel then hesitates before using air power, sends ground forces into homes instead of bombing those homes, and sustains heavy IDF casualties as a result.

Apparently, the type of air power shown in Kosovo can only be utilized by an international alliance, and certainly not by a small Jewish state.

If, as is being reported, a ceasefire is imposed in the next few days - and it is too early to say that it will actually take effect even if a UN Resolution is issued - the result of the war can probably best be described as inconclusive. On one hand, Israel will have weakened Hezbollah, and achieved some sort of resolution and international force intended to prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel from southern Lebanon. On the other hand, the Arab world will understand that Hezbollah emerged intact despite bombing Israel day after day.

This war has been widely described as existential, but that's a bit too simplistic, I think. To be sure, Israel remains engaged in an existential war with both the Palestinians and Iran. (It is unclear if it now understands that its war with the Palestinians is existential.) Yet, failure to win a decisive victory in this battle does not mean that Israel is, God forbid, doomed.

Indeed, it should not be forgotten that during Ehud Barak's last months as prime minister, when Yasser Arafat launched his terror war, Barak - doing his Crazy Eddie impersonation - meekly responded by trying to give the country away. Then, Israel was in a very precarious position. Ariel Sharon also acted with restraint for more than a year. Only in the spring of 2002 did Sharon order an offensive against Palestinian terror, and the response from President Bush was a demand that Israel stop. It took yet another wave of suicide bombings in June 2002, and the murder of dozens more Israelis, for the Bush Administration to finally shun Arafat and express support for Israel's military operations.

It may be that Shavit is right that just as Israel needed a new leader to lead Israel's war against Arafat, it will now need a new leader for the war against Iran and its proxy in Lebanon. In any event, while Israel's performance in this war might indeed lead to bad ramifications, neither Israel's friends nor its enemies should underestimate Israel's ability to learn the appropriate lessons from the events of July-August 2006, and achieve a better result, albeit at a price that will be quite painful.
posted on 8/11/2006